Jerry A. Latherow - ITLA President

When a corporation, insurance company or health care provider harms or kills a person by acting irresponsibly, deceitfully or negligently, reasonable people believe those entities should be held accountable and that those who have been wronged deserve justice.

But deep-pocket special interests aren’t always willing to do the right thing by paying fair compensation and correcting their dangerous ways. Too often, the bottom line and profits are the primary consideration, regardless of the consequences.

Headlines are dominated with examples of corporations letting profits trump basic consumer protections: massive car recalls, food recalls, serious safety issues with prescription and over-the-counter drugs and financial institutions in trouble.

From each of these headlines, three messages surface: corporations knowingly put profits ahead of public safety; federal agencies lack the resources to adequately protect and safeguard the American people; and when the first lines of defense fail to protect the safety of consumers, only the civil justice system can hold negligent corporations accountable and restore justice.

Many don’t know what the civil justice system is, or why it is important.  Each American has the constitutionally protected right to hold those who harm them responsible, whether it be another person or a large corporation.  We are afforded this right in a civil court.  However, front groups who are funded by big oil, big tobacco, pharmaceutical companies and the insurance industry are out to change that.

Our civil justice system is constantly under attack from these front groups such as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce – not to be confused with your local Chamber of Commerce – and its Illinois mouthpiece, Illinois Lawsuit Abuse Watch.  These types of groups are out to take away your constitutionally protected rights.  Why?  Because to these corporate special interests, profits are more important than the health and safety of the American public.

It’s no wonder tobacco, big oil, pharmaceutical, and insurance companies have invested so much in groups – such as Illinois Lawsuit Abuse Watch – to demonize the civil justice system.  Without it, these powerful corporations would have free reign to make and break the rules.  That’s why it’s imperative that we speak up against these groups.

These groups will compare Illinois to its Midwestern neighbors, Wisconsin and Minnesota.  We all know the story in Wisconsin, where that state’s governor has taken away rights from average citizens to benefit his big business buddies.   Minnesota’s legislature attempted to do the same thing, but the governor there vetoed the so-called lawsuit reforms calling it a “partisan political ploy” aimed to “reduce the rights of law abiding citizens and businesses to seek justice from the wrongdoing of others.”  Similar legislation appears every spring at the statehouse in Illinois, but our lawmakers are wise to the real intent of such legislation.

The reality is there is no lawsuit abuse in Illinois.  Our justice system screens out the very few suits that are filed without merit. Those who attack our civil justice system know that most litigation involves businesses suing other businesses or individuals, not individuals taking companies to court. What these front groups and their corporate sponsors do fear are meritorious lawsuits – actions brought by citizens against those producing unsafe products, polluting our environment, swindling their employees to pad profits, or otherwise acting irresponsibly.

There is no negative correlation between our state’s economy and the civil justice system. Illinoisans should be proud that our court system protects us from dangerous products and negligent behavior and holds corporate wrongdoers accountable.  The Illinois Trial Lawyers Association believes in and fights for our system of checks and balances.  No person, government official or business should be allowed to amass so much power and influence that they are able to infringe upon the right of citizens to have their day in court.

by Jerry A. Latherow, ILTA President

Karen Munoz - Associate Attorney

I never realized the crucial importance of listening until recently and the impact it has in our interactions. I was at a restaurant placing an order. I had some modifications to my dish, which I specifically told the server. Well, when my meal came out, it was exactly as it was described in the menu, but not what I ordered. Obviously not a big deal but it inspired me to ask our server what happened. She was so apologetic and said, “Gosh, I have had so many orders for this today, and it’s been so busy, and I just went into automatic mode and I must have just thought you wanted the dish the way it was.”

I recognized immediately what she was talking about. When she asked to take our order, she hardly looked up at us. Instead, it was head down, quick jot on her pad and that was it.

We have a tendency to hear what we want to hear. It’s like our brains are programmed to process information in tunnel vision format.

It’s been said that recognizing you have a problem is the first step. I began to pay more attention and realized I engaged in this type of listening/nonlistening behavior more often that I would like.

We are all guilty of it, whether it takes place at work, with our significant others or even strangers. We do it a lot at work, whether we want to admit it or not, as we spend a majority of our time at work.

You get a phone call from a client or opposing counsel, but at the same time, you may be checking your e-mail, working on a brief or in the middle of preparing for a court hearing. So we half-listen to whatever is being said on the other line. Same thing with a colleague popping into your office for a chat while you are in the middle of something. Because let’s face it, we are always in the middle of something. It’s a rare moment in life unless you are meditating or sleeping that you are doing absolutely nothing.

So your workmate comes in to ask a question or just simply to chat and we try to juggle both the conversation and the work we were doing prior to being interrupted. Guess what usually happens. Neither your work nor your colleague gets 100 percent of your attention. In the midst of this, we cheat ourselves and we cheat those we interact with. Like I said earlier, we have been programmed to think we can do multiple tasks at the same time and be more efficient with our time.

Literature and studies suggests the exact opposite. Multitasking actually takes us longer to accomplish any given task and takes away from the finished product or end result because our attention was not solely given to one thing at a time.

Another example of this behavior I have witnessed often is in depositions. You know the drill, we prepare and prepare. We comb the file for useful documents, write a marvelous outline and we are ready to depose the heck out of whomever may be in the hot seat. Well, it’s not unusual for the defending attorney in that conference room to be e-mailing, texting or playing Angry Birds while being half-present. Or the deposing attorney to be so stuck on the outline and making sure each and every question is asked that we forget to actually listen to what the witness is saying or watching for any visual cues or expressions that can lead to a whole different line of questioning, one that perhaps is beneficial to the case.

There are many reasons to stop and listen as lawyers. We can’t do our jobs to the best of our abilities when our mind is everywhere but where it needs to be. We can’t conduct a thorough deposition if we aren’t listening. Objections and the potential for other avenues of questioning get lost.

Communications and conversations with those around us suffer too. In a sense, distracted driving is no different than distracted listening. Another way this multitasking phenomena affects us as lawyers is our silly sense of pride. We think we can tackle every project we undertake although there is this nagging little voice in the back of our heads that says, “Um, how am I going to get those done, when I have X, Y and Z to also do by that deadline?” But we do it anyway. We don’t listen to that little voice, which usually turns out to be right. As a result, maybe our brief isn’t as good as it could have been if we had declined other projects.

My point is — slow down a second and listen. In the long run it could be the best thing you do and save you from providing mediocre representation or worse yet, a letter from the Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Commission.

We have been so inundated with distractions at every turn that listening has become a lost form of art. Reclaim it. It will only make you a better attorney.

- by Karen Munoz

This article will examine that statute and the Illinois Supreme Court’s recent decision in Bell v Hutsell,¹ where the plaintiffs argued that the defendants had voluntarily undertaken a duty to prohibit underage drinking. Though the court rejected the argument in that case, it did explain the circumstances under which the voluntary-undertaking theory might apply.

Supplying alcohol to a minor: the Impaired Minor Act

In 2003, the Illinois Supreme Court decision in Wakulich v Mraz,² reaffirming the 1995 supreme court case Charles v Seigfried,³ ruled that social hosts could not be held liable for furnishing alcohol to guests, even though some of those guests might be minors. This decision rejected the claim advanced by the plaintiff that the social host defendants negligently supplied alcohol to a minor and induced her to drink to a dangerous level. (The Wakulich court did, however, find that the plaintiffs adequately pled the voluntary-undertaking theory, which is discussed below.)

In its ruling, the court opined that the legislature has preempted the field of regulating alcohol-related social-host liability.⁴In effect, the court left it to the legislature to redress any failure to adequately address such behavior.

In response to the Wakulich decision, the Illinois legislature passed the Drug or Alcohol Impaired Minor Responsibility Act (Impaired Minor Act),⁵ effective October 1, 2004, which significantly changed Illinois law on social host liability.

The Impaired Minor Act imposes civil liability on “any person at least 18 years of age who willfully supplies alcoholic liquor or illegal drugs to a person under 18 years of age,” which impairs the minor, causing injury or death to another person. Specifically, the Act allows minors who are injured, or parents of minors killed as a proximate result of a social host’s provision of alcohol to that minor, to bring a cause of action against all persons

(i) who, by willfully selling, giving, or delivering alcoholic liquor or illegal drugs, causes or contributes to the impairment of the person under the age of 18; or

(ii) who, by willfully permitting consumption of alcoholic liquor or illegal drugs on non-residential premises owned or controlled by the person over the age of 18, causes or contributes to the impairment of the person under the age of 18.⁶

No defense of contributory negligence or willful and wanton conduct on the part of the injured party is allowed under the Act. Both economic and non-economic damages are allowed under the Act, including damages for emotional distress, loss of companionship, disfigurement, and the cost of future medical care.

The Act also provides a mechanism for the recovery of reasonable attorney’s fees, trial expenses, and punitive damages. Those damages are aimed at punishing parents or other adults who provide alcohol to minors.

Liability under the Act is broad enough to cover loss suffered by others injured by an impaired minor who operates a motor vehicle. Any adult who facilitates underage drinking is a target under this Act. This law introduces, for the first time, a civil penalty for adults who negligently foster the intoxication of a minor. As for suing a residential adult social host who “willfully supplies” alcohol, some affirmative action on the part of the host is required under the Act to trigger liability.

Note that in a non-residential setting, merely “permitting” or facilitating alcoholic consumption can be a ground for liability. In addition, the Liquor Control Act prohibits a minor’s consumption of alcohol at a social gathering, and violation of the Act is a Class A misdemeanor.⁷ In short, if parents permit minors to drink alcohol in their home, they can be held criminally accountable. Most homeowner insurance policies now provide some coverage for social host liability claims.⁸

Social host liability for “voluntary undertakings”: the Restatement standard

The Impaired Minor Act does not apply if the social host did not “willful[ly] supply” alcohol. And as the following discussion shows, social hosts who simply turn a blind eye to underage drinking will not be held liable. But what about a social host who “voluntarily undertakes” to supervise a social gathering in his or her home where alcohol is consumed by minors? The Illinois Supreme Court’s Bell v Hutsell⁹ case helps define social host liability in such cases.

The Bell facts. In Bell, a mother sued on behalf of her 18-year-old son, who died in an automobile accident after he allegedly drank alcohol at a party his friend threw at his parents’ home. The plaintiff alleged the defendants (the friend’s parents) voluntarily undertook a duty to prohibit underage drinking and possession of alcoholic beverages on their premises and to inspect, monitor, and supervise underage partygoers to those ends. She further argued that they negligently performed that duty.

This intention was communicated to the defendants’ son, though nobody else. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants were present in the part of their house where the underage drinking was taking place but did not prevent it.

The voluntary-undertaking theory. The Bell court noted that despite the general rule immunizing social hosts from liability for providing alcohol, defendants have been held liable for an alcohol-related injury based upon a theory of voluntary undertaking. Although the court found that the plaintiff’s allegations did not trigger liability in that case, the analysis used by the court describes the law governing the voluntary-undertaking duty and its use in actions implicating the liability of social hosts.

In Bell, the Illinois Supreme Court relied on Sections 323¹⁰ and 324A¹¹ of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Specifically, these sections require affirmative acts to effect an expressed intention (in this case prohibiting underage drinking at defendants’ home). The court held that defendants took no such affirmative acts, nor did anyone rely on the defendants’ intentions or suffer from an increased risk of danger. Importantly, the court distinguished this case from one of misfeasance, holding that the defendants’ actions constituted nonfeasance instead.

The court contrasted Bell to cases like Wakulich, where the defendants’ affirmative conduct in asserting control over an impaired person increased that person’s risk of harm or created a risk of harm to others. The court observed that under a voluntary-undertaking theory of liability, the defendant’s duty of care is limited to the extent of the undertaking and is narrowly construed.¹²

The defendants argued that the plaintiff’s voluntary-undertaking theory was simply a way to circumvent the rule against social host liability set forth in Charles v Seigfried.¹³ But the court rejected this contention, basing its reasoning onWakulich.

In Wakulich, the plaintiff alleged that two minor brothers supplied alcohol to the plaintiff’s 16-year-old daughter at their home. As a result, the girl became intoxicated and lost consciousness. She began to vomit, so the hosts removed her soiled clothing and placed a pillow under her head to prevent aspiration. They provided no other assistance, and indeed prevented others at the home from getting the girl any medical attention. The girl died the next day as a result of alcohol poisoning, after the hosts’ father allegedly ordered them to remove her from the house.¹⁴

The Wakulich court rejected the defense argument that the “plaintiff’s voluntary undertaking theory [was] simply an attempt to circumvent the rule against social host liability set forth in Charles.”¹⁵ The court instead remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings on the voluntary-undertaking theory.

In Bell, the court emphasized the necessity of reliance for the voluntary-undertaking duty to apply, repeating that “‘[u]nder Illinois law, a plaintiff’s reliance on the defendant’s promise is an independent, essential element in cases of nonfeasance.’”¹⁶ The court then cited comments to the Restatement, noting as follows:

The fact that the actor gratuitously starts in to aid another does not necessarily require him to continue his services. He is not required to continue them indefinitely, or even until he has done everything in his power to aid and protect the other. The actor may normally abandon his efforts at any time unless, by giving the aid, he has put the other in a worse position than he was in before the actor attempted to aid him.¹⁷

Indeed, though the Bell complaint alleged that the undertaking was communicated to the defendants’ son, there was no claim that the defendants’ intent was communicated to anyone else.

No voluntary undertaking. In Bell, the court opined that the defendants’ monitoring did nothing to ensure “the protection of the other’s person,” or “the protection of a third person,” pursuant to the requisites of sections 323 and 324A of the Restatement, and was not a substantial step in the alleged undertaking. The court reiterated that there must have been some affirmative action taken in an attempt to prohibit possession and consumption of alcohol, the objective of the undertaking, yet none was alleged. Significantly, the factual allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint were held not to support an inference that the defendants’ expressed intent and later inaction increased the risk of harm to the plaintiff’s son,¹⁸ nor did it evince reliance or change of position.

According to the Illinois Supreme Court, facts alleged in Bell were different than those in Wakulich or Simmons v Homatas, where the court considered a different section of the Restatement.¹⁹ In those cases, as in Bell, the court applied Restatement principles. However, in both of those cases, the defendants’ affirmative conduct was an assertion of control over an inebriated and significantly impaired person. The conduct thus increased the risk of harm to that person or created a risk of harm to others.

This was found not to be the case in Bell, where the defendants in no way asserted control over the plaintiffs’ son before he left the party inebriated and crashed his vehicle. Moreover, on broader policy grounds the court felt that imposing a duty and liability would only have deterred those who might volunteer assistance to others.

In essence, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the absence of social host liability in that situation meant that the parents could not be liable for merely hosting a party that served alcohol, even if the guests were minors. The promise to monitor was not enough to trigger liability. Ironically, an active attempt by the parents to intervene and, e.g., confiscate alcohol might have made them liable.

The Bell decision, where the defendants were found not to have owed the plaintiffs’ son a duty to prohibit his voluntary consumption of alcohol, was based on what the court characterized as nonfeasance, not malfeasance. The ruling confirms the continuing significance of the distinction between malfeasance and nonfeasance in social-host cases. It also demonstrates the clear pleading requirements required to establish the voluntary undertaking of a duty.

The decision leaves open an exceptionally narrow pathway for suing a social host on a voluntary-assumption-of-duty theory. Success for plaintiffs under that theory clearly requires that the social host took some affirmative act that the plaintiff relied on.

Supplying alcohol to an adult

The Illinois Supreme Court’s decision in Wakulich,²⁰ which held that there is no liability for social hosts who furnish alcohol to guests absent a voluntary undertaking, remains correct for adult guests. However, under the 2003 Illinois Dram Shop Act,²⁰ licensed commercial vendors who cause the intoxication of a patron who in turn causes injury are now strictly liable.

But this law comes with significant limitations, including low recovery limits (modified each year based on the consumer price index in Illinois) and a bar on recovery for someone who is “complicit” in the drinking. Thus, if a person becomes intoxicated at a bar and subsequently causes a wreck that injures his or her passenger, that passenger cannot recover against the bar if he or she was at the bar with the driver and contributed to the intoxication.

Conclusion

Social host liability encapsulates a broad range of cases and injuries, including not only auto accidents, but also slip-and-fall, fireworks-related, and wrongful death cases. The law of social host liability in Illinois for underage alcohol-related injuries is now largely governed by legislation, which provides clear rules.

As Bell demonstrates however, even where there is no “willful supply” of alcohol, the Second Restatement and the theory of voluntary undertaking offer another avenue of liability against social hosts in limited circumstances. The Bell opinion makes clear that the pleading requirements will be strictly construed. Evidence of affirmative acts by the defendant and reliance on those acts by the plaintiff are crucial in successfully adducing such a duty.

Marty Dolan <mdolan@dolanlegal.com> is the principal and Karen Munoz <kmunoz@dolanlegal.com> a fourth-year associate at Dolan Law. The firm handles complex civil litigation and personal injury matters.

- Via The Illinois Bar Journal

Now I don’t want you thinking I take my life lessons from pop singers, but her words resonated with me. As young law students, we begin the process of thinking analytically and with reason. Emotions, we are taught, have no place in the law (see “Legally Blonde”). I say a little bit of emotion here and there can bring about positive changes.

Anyway, as I staggered back from that bad day in court, a ton of emotions raced through my body. Anger, bewilderment, disappointment, and eventually, resignation. Essentially a cornucopia of how did that happen?

But then I realized that most days at work I don’t experience those emotions. The practice runs smoothly, work gets done, people are happy. No yelling, no crying and everything is great in the world. Even when something exceptionally good happens, tough motion won or case settled, I don’t really think too much about it. It’s on to the next one, which I know is not a very sane way to live.

But when something “bad” happens, the world stops. At least mine does. I will dwell and analyze and dissect what went wrong. The bad days are a small percentage in the practice but for some reason they can feel catastrophic. I am pretty sure there is a name for this phenomena but I will leave that to the therapists and psychologists of the world. All I know is it occurs and although we may focus on the negative, we can actually take the negative and use it for a positive. A learning experience.

Fortunately and unfortunately, young lawyers of the universe, you will have good days and bad days in the practice of law. The good days, hopefully, you will learn to appreciate. Without the bad days though, most of us forget to reflect. It’s the bad experiences that we remember for some reason. In the same vein though, I have learned more from my mistakes and for that I am grateful. The key is to use those analytical and logic skills we have at our disposal and see what went astray so we don’t repeat or get burned again.

Nobody wants to be that kid that keeps putting his finger in the burning stove, right? Getting into the habit of recognizing the problem, whatever it may be, and learning how to rectify it will help so much in the long run of your practice. It is a good habit to get into. Don’t brush off the mistakes or blame someone else. Take advantage and really reflect. What went wrong, how did it go wrong and what do I do so this doesn’t happen again?

Listen, no one is perfect, and sometimes you will have to accept that you will have bad days in the practice. There are situations that will be out of your control and you will have to take the lump and move on. Trying to be perfect all the time will leave you exhausted and too scared to take risks. What I have learned so far is to trust yourself. There will be times you will wonder if this profession is for you, if you can do anything right or keep your boss or your clients happy. I am sure there will be times you will wonder how the heck you managed to pass a two-day bar exam but can’t use spell check correctly to the consternation of your boss. Don’t go down that road.

Keep your head up, learn from your mistakes and you will get better with each passing day of practice. It’s called practice for a reason! In all seriousness though, law just like in life will leave us with bruising days. As long as we are learning and using the lessons moving forward, I think we will be okay. The scars will fade and we will hopefully be left with a practice we can be proud of.

- Via Chicago Daily News Bulletin

Reuters reports that Holder said federal prosecutors have charged more than 2,100 individuals with mortgage fraud-related crimes in the past two years, and have taken in some $4 billion in healthcare fraud recoveries in the past year, and quotes him as saying, “We found that much of the conduct that led to the financial crisis was unethical and irresponsible. But we have also discovered that some of this behavior — while morally reprehensible — may not necessarily have been criminal.”

The Wall Street Journal reports that Holder said, “Real people are hurt. Real people are suffering. Not every case ends upon the front page of the New York Times, but by the sheer number of cases the Justice Department has been a success. And we’re not done.”

-Via Chicago Daily News Bulletin

Martin Dolan spoke about the legal responsibility of manufacturers, distributors, and sellers of inherently hazardous equipment to provide adequate safety warnings to consumers and the potential liability they face when they fail to do so.

In this case, the failure of a snowblower manufacturer to include adequate safety warnings
about possible injuries when the product’s engine was in idle caused serious injury to a 14-year-old boy.

- Via NBC5 WMAQ Channel 5

Those allegations, and another leveled recently at a Baltimore-area hospital, have highlighted an arcane record-keeping practice called “upcoding.”

The practice — giving a patient a more severe diagnosis to receive higher reimbursement — is a target in the federal government’s push to root out billions of dollars a year in health care fraud. And investigators are using increasingly sophisticated software to detect questionable billing patterns in Maryland and across the country.

The U.S. Justice Department has accused a rehabilitation hospital owned by the University of Maryland Medical System of purposely misdiagnosing patients with severe cases of malnutrition and is suing for $8.1 million. The medical system denies the allegations and is fighting the case.

As the government uses more high-tech tools to identify problems, defendants such as the University of Maryland Medical System say unusual coding patterns are sometimes simply mistakes or misunderstandings, rather than fraud.

The lawsuit filed in October accused Kernan Orthopedics and Rehabilitation of manipulating its computerized billing system to make it look like patients had a severe form of malnutrition called kwashiorkor. This enabled the hospital to get bigger payouts fromMedicare and other government health programs, the lawsuit said.

But the medical system’s CEO, Robert Chrencik, said in his first comments about the case that none of the patients’ records showed a diagnosis of kwashiorkor. Instead, he said the disease shares a computer coding with another nutritional disorder, “protein deficiency,” which some Kernan patients do have.

He said a recent change in the coding system made it appear that the number of patients with the nutritional deficiency had drastically increased at Kernan, when it hadn’t. The medical system has asked the court to dismiss the case.

“We’re not coding things that weren’t coded before,” Chrencik said. “It looked like we started coding nutritional deficits. It looked like we had this huge uptick, but in reality they had always been there.”

The decision of who is right will ultimately be made in U.S. District Court, but the case brings up an issue that has for years contributed to billions of dollars a year in health care fraud. The Department of Justice recovered $5.6 billion in fraudulent payouts last year, and more than $2.9 billion was health care-related.

The state Health Services Cost Review Commission, which sets hospital rates in Maryland, also made the severity of an illness more important when it changed its rules in 2005, tying higher reimbursement to more severe secondary diseases.

Upcoding made headlines in the 1990s, when many hospitals were accused of profiting from the practice. The most visible case was that of Columbia/HCA, a national chain sued by the federal government for Medicare fraud that included upcoding. The hospital chain, which eventually changed its name to HCA-The Healthcare Co., settled in 2000 for $840 million, which was the largest settlement in history at the time.

It is unclear how much upcoding contributes to Medicare fraud today, because it is not tracked separately, but government officials said it is still an issue.

Thomas V. Russell, the inspector general for the Maryland Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, said the state does routine data monitoring of Medicare payment records to identify “outliers or billing patterns that are out of sorts.” Federal “Medicare Strike Force” teams also monitor Medicare data in several cities and brought to light $1 billion in fraud cases last year.

The state also gets tips from hot lines and former employees who have been encouraged by new laws that reward whistle-blowers. The False Claims Act allows anyone with knowledge of a false Medicaid or Medicare claim to file a lawsuit and share a percentage of damages. Maryland passed its version of the legislation last year.

“We are being given more tools by the federal government to pursue this,” Russell said. “Every day there are more software updates that come out that will perform data analysis to kick out outliers that may identify problems with upcoding and billing issues.”

The case against Clinton-based Greater Metropolitan Orthopaedics Institute was settled last year for $2.5 million under the False Claims Act. The settlement resolved allegations that over a four-year period beginning in 2001 doctors billed for patients they never saw or services that weren’t in patient medical records. The institute also entered into a Corporate Integrity Agreement with the Department of Health and Human Services, according to federal prosecutors.

In Connecticut, Masonicare Health Center agreed last year to pay $447,776 to settle allegations over the way it billed for the use of the drug Lupron to treat prostate cancer. The government alleged that the health center billed for a higher dosage of Lupron — one that is normally used to treat fibroids and endometriosis in women, and that has a higher reimbursement. The company did not admit wrongdoing in the settlement.

California-based Prime Healthcare Services, meanwhile, is being investigated by state and federal authorities for possible upcoding by diagnosing elderly patients for septicemia blood infections to get higher Medicare reimbursements, according to news reports. The company denies the allegations.

- Via The Baltimore Sun

The teleconference will be held on Thursday, January 19, 2012 at 12:00pm PT / 1:00 pm MT / 2:00 pm CT / 3:00 ET and will last 60 minutes. Not a committee member? ABA YLD members can join for FREE. The teleconference will by complimentary for ABA YLD members. 

Click here to REGISTER NOW

This teleconference will discuss why it is important for minority attorneys to be involved in pro bono work and explore ways for minority attorneys to get more involved in pro bono. The speakers will include an attorney who spends 100% of her time doing pro bono work on behalf of her firm, as well as public interest attorneys working with volunteer/pro bono attorneys who will speak about the importance of volunteer minority attorneys.

Dolan Law’s own Karen Munoz will be moderating along with Kenya A. Jenkins-Wright of Green and Letts. The speakers will include Mara Block of Legal Assistance Foundation, Stacey Wang of Holland & Knight in Los Angeles, CA, Richard M. Wheelock of Legal Assistance Foundation, and Cheryl Zalenski of ABA Center for Pro Bono.

A complimentary download of this program and other committee programs will be available to ABA members via the committee webpage.

In a federal lawsuit filed Monday, Joanne Chavez Buchanan claims that the district’s stated reason for firing her, to save money, was a pretext, and that she was let go in retaliation for questioning hiring practices.

Buchanan contends that she was instructed to sidestep the district’s hiring protocol in filling seasonal jobs for the summer internship program and in replacing a receptionist. The lawsuit names the district and district board president Jim Hickey as defendants.

In May, Buchanan was given a list of seven people to hire for the internship program for students in the district who are 18 or older, according to the lawsuit.

It says the list included the two teenage sons of Cook County Commissioner Elizabeth Gorman (R-Orland Park), neither of whom was yet 18.

When Buchanan objected to hiring the boys because of their age and the apparent political influence, Hickey ordered her to hire them anyway, the suit says.

Gorman backed a political slate, Fiscal Voices for Orland, that ran candidates for village trustee in Orland Park as well as two successful candidates for the fire district board, Blair Rhode and Christopher Evoy. Gorman administered the oath of office to Rhode and Evoy when they were sworn in last spring.

Gorman on Monday called the lawsuit “frivolous” and said she believed her sons met the criteria for the internship program. Gorman is not a defendant in the complaint.

“She’s (Buchanan) trying to grab some attention and grab some of the taxpayers’ money,” Gorman said.

The lawsuit says Buchanan, who had been with the district since 2008, was fired June 15 by Acting Fire Chief Ray Kay and the district’s attorney, James Roche, who came to her office. When she asked why, Buchanan was told the board wanted to reduce costs and cut salaries, according to the suit.

It says Buchanan offered to take a pay cut but was told by Roche that wasn’t an option and a replacement had been hired.

The district’s current HR director submitted her resume in May — shortly after Rhode and Evoy were sworn in and Hickey was named board president — and completed an application for the job more than a week prior to Buchanan’s firing, according to district records.

Buchanan’s attorney, Martin Dolan, said his client’s allegations show that the fire district’s hiring is “classic pay-to-play.”

“Non-politically connected college kids and taxpayers lose out,” and it “erodes the public trust in government,” Dolan said.

- Via The Southtown Star

Police and civilian detention aides were accused in two separate lawsuits of ignoring obvious signs of medical distress that resulted in the deaths of people held in custody.

“It’s clearly indicative of a pattern that is very troubling,” said Ald. Edward Burke, 14th, a former police officer and attorney. Burke is chairman of the Finance Committee, which recommended the settlements be approved at Wednesday’s full City Council meeting. 

“In the ordinary scheme of things, from just a human perspective, people should be treated with compassion and humanity,” Burke said. “But from a more practical sense, the taxpayers are now suffering to the extent of millions of dollars because these officers in detention facilities have ignored what appears to be clear signs of people in distress.”

Burke also expressed concerns after his committee recommended settling two other police cases. In one, police were accused of attempting to railroad a U.S. war veteran who was acquitted but nevertheless lost his new job after two months behind bars. In the other, police allegedly stepped on the head of a quadriplegic man after beating and kicking him.

The most costly case, which would be settled for more than $2 million, involved the death of Patricia Cobige in a lockup after her arrest June 10, 2006, on heroin-possession charges. A cellmate testified that Cobige, 46, repeatedly complained of feeling ill and requested help but received none, First Assistant Corporation Counsel Leslie Darling said.

Her death from a pre-existing heart condition at the Grand Central District police lockup came eight hours after Cook County sheriff’s deputies would not process her for a court appearance because she was too ill to comply with simple commands, Darling said.

A jury in February 2010 awarded her son $5 million, but the city appealed the matter and was able to reduce the settlement, Darling said.

The committee recommended a $1 million settlement for the sister of Rafe McMullan Jr., a 52-year-old man arrested on criminal trespassing charges who died in the central detention unit Nov. 12, 2008. A $3 million payout had been sought in the case, Darling said.

Witnesses from the lockup were prepared to testify that McMullan screamed and yelled for medical help but received none, Darling said. When he was found unresponsive on the cell floor, he had been dead for at least two hours, she said.

Aldermen also recommended settling for $560,000 a lawsuit filed by Iraq War veteran Frank Craig, who was “mistakenly pursued and arrested” for armed robbery and later acquitted, Darling said. The federal judge in Craig’s civil lawsuit concluded that a Chicago police detective “falsely testified before a grand jury,” Darling said.

“Mr. Craig was held in jail for over two months, causing him to lose a job at the state of Illinois that he was about to start the day after his arrest, which would have provided full benefits to his family,” Darling said. He was “unable to find similar paying work or benefits for his family,” she said.

Aldermen also recommended paying out $290,000 to Daniel and Karina Casares. Officers in October 2006 pulled Daniel Casares, a 26-year-old quadriplegic, from a vehicle and punched and kicked him, according to witnesses cited in the lawsuit.

The officers also stepped on his head and arrested and handcuffed his pregnant sister Karina when she tried to intervene, they alleged.

“We look at each case individually and defend each case individually,” Darling said. “We are not saying there is any pattern here.”

- Via Chicago Tribune